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FOREWORD
Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is
widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How
could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an
enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial
base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan
was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s
decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them?
Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding
defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable
peace?
Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision
for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese
pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by
the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in
East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues
that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well
as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from
cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that
the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in
Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness
of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the
Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an
aroused American society and overestimated their own martial
prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He
believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that
the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains
lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign
policy and defense decisionmakers.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to the national security debate over the
use of force to advance the objectives of U.S. foreign policy.

		
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The Japanese decision to initiate war against the
United States in 1941 continues to perplex. Did the
Japanese recognize the odds against them? How did
they expect to defeat the United States? The presumption of irrationality is natural, given Japan’s acute imperial overstretch in 1941 and America’s overwhelming industrial might and latent military power. The
Japanese decision for war, however, must be seen in
the light of the available alternatives in the fall of 1941,
which were either national economic suffocation or
surrender of Tokyo’s empire on the Asian mainland.
Though Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root
cause of the Pacific War, the road to Pearl Harbor was
built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations,
most of them mired in mutual cultural ignorance and
racial arrogance.
Japan’s aggression in China, military alliance with
Hitler, and proclamation of a “Greater East Asian
Co-Prosperity Sphere” that included resource-rich
Southeast Asia were major milestones along the road to
war, but the proximate cause was Japan’s occupation of
southern French Indochina in July 1941, which placed
Japanese forces in a position to grab Malaya, Singapore,
and the Dutch East Indies. Japan’s threatened conquest
of Southeast Asia, which in turn would threaten
Great Britain’s ability to resist Nazi aggression in
Europe, prompted the administration of Franklin D.
Roosevelt to sanction Japan by imposing an embargo
on U.S. oil exports upon which the Japanese economy
was critically dependent. Yet the embargo, far from
deterring further Japanese aggression, prompted a
Tokyo decision to invade Southeast Asia. By mid-1941
Japanese leaders believed that war with the United
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States was inevitable and that it was imperative to
seize the Dutch East Indies, which offered a substitute
for dependency on American oil. The attack on Pearl
Harbor was essentially a flanking raid in support of
the main event, which was the conquest of Malaya,
Singapore, the Indies, and the Philippines,
Japan’s decision for war rested on several assumptions, some realistic, others not. The first was
that time was working against Japan—i.e., the longer
they took to initiate war with the United States, the
dimmer its prospects for success. The Japanese also
assumed they had little chance of winning a protracted
war with the United States but hoped they could force
the Americans into a murderous, island-by-island
slog across the Central and Southwestern Pacific that
would eventually exhaust American will to fight on to
total victory. The Japanese believed they were racially
and spiritually superior to the Americans, whom
they regarded as an effete, creature-comforted people
divided by political factionalism and racial and class
strife.
U.S. attempts to deter Japanese expansion into
the Southwestern Pacific via the imposition of harsh
economic sanctions, redeployment of the U.S. Fleet from
southern California to Pearl Harbor, and the dispatch
of B-17 long-range bombers to the Philippines all failed
because the United States insisted that Japan evacuate
both Indochina and China as the price for a restoration
of U.S. trade. The United States demanded, in effect,
that Japan abandon its empire, and by extension its
aspiration to become a great power, and submit to the
economic dominion of the United States—something
no self-respecting Japanese leader could accept.
The Japanese-American road to the Pacific War in
1941 yields several enduring lessons of particular rele-
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vance for today’s national security decisionmakers:
1. Fear and honor, “rational” or not, can motivate
as much as interest.
2. There is no substitute for knowledge of a potential
adversary’s history and culture.
3. Deterrence lies in the mind of the deterree, not
the deterrer.
4. Strategy must always inform and guide operations.
5. Economic sanctioning can be tantamount to an
act of war.
6. The presumption of moral or spiritual superiority
can fatally discount the consequences of an enemy’s
material superiority.
7. “Inevitable” war easily becomes a self-fulfilling
prophesy.

ix

JAPAN’S DECISION FOR WAR IN 1941:
SOME ENDURING LESSONS
Introduction: A “Strategic Imbecility”?
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii,
continues to perplex. American naval historian Samuel
Eliot Morison called Tokyo’s decision for war against
the United States “a strategic imbecility.”1 How, in
mid-1941, could Japan, militarily mired in China and
seriously considering an opportunity for war with the
Soviet Union, even think about yet another war, this
one against a distant country with a 10-fold industrial
superiority? The United States was not only stronger;
it lay beyond Japan’s military reach. The United States
could out-produce Japan in every category of armaments
as well as build weapons, such as long-range bombers,
that Japan could not; and though Japan could fight a
war in East Asia and the Western Pacific, it could not
threaten the American homeland. In attacking Pearl
Harbor, Japan elected to fight a geographically limited
war against an enemy capable of waging a total war
against the Japanese home islands themselves.
Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them?
What could possibly prompt such a reckless course
of action as the attack on Pearl Harbor? Fatalism?
Delusional reasoning? Madness? Was there no
acceptable alternative to war with the United States
in 1941? And if not, how did Tokyo expect to compel
the United States to accept Japanese hegemony in East
Asia? Did the Japanese have a concept of victory, or
at least of avoiding defeat? Or were they simply, as
New York congressman Hamilton Fish declared the
day after Pearl Harbor, a “stark, raving mad” people
who, by attacking the United States, had “committed
military, naval, and national suicide”?2
1

What lessons can be drawn from the Japanese
decision for war in 1941? From U.S.-Japanese policy
interaction during the months leading to Pearl Harbor?
Are there lessons of value to today’s national security
decisionmakers?
The Presumption of Irrationality.
The Pacific War arose out of Japan’s drive for
national glory and economic security via the conquest
of East Asia and the Roosevelt administration’s belief
that it could check Japan’s bid for an Asian empire via
trade sanctions and military deployments. The Japanese
sought to free themselves from economic dependence
on the United States, whereas the Americans sought
to use that dependence to contain Japanese imperial
ambitions. The Japanese sought to overturn the
territorial status quo in Asia, whereas the United
States sought to preserve it. Given the scope of Japan’s
ambitions, which included the expulsion of Western
power and influence from Southeast Asia, and given
Japan’s alliance with Nazi Germany (against whom
the United States was tacitly allied with Great Britain),
war with the United States was probably inevitable by
the end of 1941 even though Japanese prospects for
winning a war with the United States were minimal.
The disaster that awaited Japan in its war with the
United States was rooted in a fatal excess of ambition
over power. Japan’s imperial ambitions, which included
Soviet territory in Northeast Asia as well as China and
Western-controlled territory in Southeast Asia, lay
beyond Japan’s material capacity. Japan wanted to be
a great power of the first rank like the United States,
Great Britain, and Germany but lacked the industrial
base and military capacity to become one. Moreover,
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Japan sought both a continental empire over the
teeming populations of the Asian mainland, as well as
a maritime empire in the Southwestern Pacific—a tall
order given China’s rising nationalism and the global
naval superiority of Great Britain and the United States.
Few Japanese leaders appreciated the limits of Japan’s
power; on the contrary, many had wildly exaggerated
ideas of Japan’s destiny and ability to fulfill it.
The presumption of Japanese irrationality is natural
given Japan’s acute imperial overstretch in 1941 and
the huge disparity between Japan’s industrial base
and military power and America’s industrial base
and latent military power. Dean Acheson, who in
1941 was Assistant Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs, declared before Pearl Harbor that “no rational
Japanese could believe that an attack on us could result
in anything but disaster for his country.”3 Secretary of
War Henry L. Stimson believed the Japanese, “however
wicked their intentions, would have the good sense
not to get involved in a war with the United States.”4
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto certainly had good sense.
In October 1940 he warned that “[t]o fight the United
States is like fighting the whole world. . . . Doubtless I
shall die aboard the Nagato [his flagship]. Meanwhile,
Tokyo will be burnt to the ground three times.”5 Barely
2 months before Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto predicted:
It is obvious that a Japanese-American war will become
a protracted one. As long as the tides of war are in
our favor, the United States will never stop fighting.
As a consequence, the war will continue for several
years, during which [our] material [resources] will be
exhausted, vessels and arms will be damaged, and they
can be replaced only with great difficulties. Ultimately
we will not be able to contend with [the United States].
As a result of war the people’s livelihood will become
indigent . . . and it is hard not to imagine [that] the
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situation will become out of control. We must not start a
war with so little chance of success.6

Postwar assessments are no less condemnatory.
“The Japanese bet, in 1941,” wrote Raymond Aron in
1966, “was senseless, since on paper the Empire of the
Rising Sun had no chance of winning and could avoid
losing only if the Americans were too lazy or cowardly
to conquer.”7 Gordon Prange, the great historian
of Pearl Harbor, called the attack the beginning of
“a reckless war it [Japan] could not possibly win.”8
Edward N. Luttwak, in his Strategy: The Logic of War
and Peace, contended that the Japanese had no victory
options after Pearl Harbor other than “an invasion of
California, followed by the conquest of the major centers
of American life and culminating with an imposed
peace dictated to some collaborating government in
Washington.” Luttwak conceded that such a strategy
lay fantastically beyond Japan’s power, and, in fact,
no Japanese leader ever proposed an invasion of the
United States. “So the best Japanese option after Pearl
Harbor was to sue immediately for peace, bargaining
away Japan’s ability to resist eventual defeat for some
years in exchange for whatever the United States would
concede to avoid having to fight for its victory.”9 For
strategist Colin Gray, the “Asia-Pacific War of 1941-45
was a conflict that Imperial Japan was always going to
lose. It remains a cultural and strategic puzzle why so
many Japanese military and political leaders endorsed
the decision to go to war in 1941 while knowing that
fact.”10 Roberta Wohlstetter, in her path-breaking Pearl
Harbor: Warning and Decision, denounced the fanciful
Japanese thinking behind the decision for war: “Most
unreal was their assumption that the United States,
with 10 times the military potential and a reputation
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for waging war until unconditional surrender, would
after a short struggle accept the annihilation of a
considerable part of its naval and air forces and the
whole of its power in the Far East.”11 Perhaps the most
savage indictment is that of Haruo Tohmatsu and H. P.
Willmott:
[N]o state or nation has ever been granted immunity from
its own stupidity. But Japan’s defeat in World War II was
awesome. The coalition of powers that it raised against
itself, the nature of its defeat across an entire ocean,
and the manner in which the war ended represented an
astonishing and remarkable, if unintended, achievement
on the part of Japan.12

Was the Japanese decision for war in 1941 just a matter
of stupidity? Can it be dismissed as simply a cultural
puzzle? Is it beyond comprehension?
Thucydides famously explained the desire of
ancient Athens to retain its empire by declaring that
“fear, honor, and interest” were among “three of the
strongest motives.”13 Realist theories in international
politics focus on calculations of power and interest
as the primary drivers of state behavior, and in so
doing tend to discount factors, such as ideology and
pride, that distort “rational” analysis of risks and
rewards. Ideology and pride, however, are central to
understanding the international behavior of many
states, including Japan from 1931 to 1945. For some
states, including Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany,
ideology and national interest were inseparable.
Indeed, the influence of ideology on the foreign
policy decisionmaking of the great powers of the 20th
century, especially Imperial Germany, Soviet Russia,
Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, Communist China,
and—yes—the United States, deserves more academic
scrutiny than it has received.
5

It is the central conclusion of this monograph
that the Japanese decision for war against the United
States in 1941 was dictated by Japanese pride and the
threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United
States. The United States sought to deter Japanese
imperial expansion into Southeast Asia by employing
its enormous leverage over the Japanese economy; it
demanded that Japan withdraw its forces from both
Indochina and China—in effect that Japan renounce its
empire in exchange for a restoration of trade with the
United States and acceptance of American principles
of international behavior. Observed Sir Basil Henry
Liddell Hart in retrospect: “No Government, least of
all the Japanese, could be expected to swallow such
humiliating conditions, and utter loss of face.”14
This conclusion excuses neither the attack on
Pearl Harbor nor the stupidity of Tokyo’s statecraft in
the 1930s in placing Japan in a situation where war,
surrender, and impoverishment were the only policy
choices available. Like Nazi Germany, Japan was, in
the decade of the 1930s, a serial aggressor state that
eventually brought about its own downfall by picking
too many powerful enemies. Japan’s attempt to conquer
China and to displace Western power in Southeast
Asia inevitably provoked armed resistance. Stumbling
into a war that Japan was “always going to lose” owed
much to Japanese racism, fatalism, imperial arrogance,
and cultural ignorance. The Japanese confused honor
with interest by permitting their imperial ambitions
to run far ahead of their military capacity to achieve
them. Indeed, the Japanese, like the Germans (and
later, the Israelis), displayed a remarkable incapacity
for sound strategic thinking; they were simultaneously
mesmerized by short-term operational opportunities
and blind to their likely disastrous long-term strategic
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consequences. How else could Tokyo consider war
with the United States and the Soviet Union in addition
to a debilitating 4-year war it did not know how to win
in China?
Nor does this monograph’s thesis excuse the
savagery of Japanese behavior in East Asia during
the 1930s and 1940s or the unwillingness of postwar
Japanese governments to acknowledge and atone
for that behavior. The Japanese, unlike the Germans,
have refused to come to terms with their past wars of
conquest and their atrocious treatment of conquered
populations, and the argument that the American
atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki absolves
the Japanese of any moral responsibility for their own
prior transgressions in East Asia is patently absurd. (In
October 2008, the chief of staff of the Japanese air force
was relieved of command for writing an essay in which
he justified Japanese colonialism, denied that Japan
had waged wars of aggression, and suggested that
Roosevelt had lured the Japanese into attacking Pearl
Harbor.15 The incident was but the latest involving a
misstatement of the history of Japan’s behavior in East
Asia in the 1930s and 1940s by a high-ranking Japanese
official.)
All that said, however, it is necessary to observe
that the United States was also guilty of grievous
miscalculation in the Pacific in 1941. It takes at least
two parties to transform a political dispute into
war. Racism was hardly unique to the Japanese, and
Americans were, if anything, even more culturally
ignorant of Japan than the Japanese were of the United
States. The conviction, widespread within the Roosevelt
administration until the last months of 1941, that no
sensible Japanese leader could rationally contemplate
war with the United States, blinded key policymakers
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to the likely consequences of such reckless decisions
as the imposition of what amounted to a complete
trade embargo of Japan in the summer of 1941. The
embargo abruptly deprived Japan of 80 percent of its
oil requirements, confronting Tokyo with the choice of
either submitting to U.S. demands that it give up its
empire in China and resume its economic dependency
on the United States or, alternatively, advancing into
resource-rich Southeast Asia and placing its expanded
empire on an economically independent foundation.
The embargo thus provoked rather than cowed Japan.
David Kahn has observed that:
American racism and rationalism kept the United States
from thinking that Japan would attack it. . . . Japan was
not only more distant [than Germany]; since she had no
more than half America’s population and only one-ninth
of America’s industrial output, rationality seemed to
preclude her attacking the United States. And disbelief
in a Japanese attack was reinforced by belief in the
superiority of the white race. Americans looked upon
Japanese as bucktoothed, bespectacled little yellow men,
forever photographing things with their omnipresent
cameras so they could copy them. Such opinions were
held not only by common bigots but by opinion makers
as well.16

Indeed, more than a few administration decisionmakers, Stimson among them, suspected that Germany was behind the Pearl Harbor attack. Prange observed that “It was difficult for these men in Washington to accept the fact that a military operation so swift,
so ruthless, so painfully successful—in a word, so blitzkrieg—in nature did not originate with Hitler.”17
It was easy to dismiss the Japanese as a serious
military challenge. Today, “we can easily forget how
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little credibility Westerners assigned to the Japanese
military in 1941,” reminds Jean Edward Smith.
The army had been bogged down in China for four
years; Zhukov had made quick work of the garrison
in Manchukuo; and the Japanese Navy had not been
engaged in battle on the high seas since 1905. “The Japs,”
as FDR called them, might prevail in Southeast Asia, but
they were scarcely seen as a threat to American forces in
the Pacific, certainly not to Pearl Harbor, which both the
Army and the Navy believed to be impregnable.18

Indeed, the crushing defeat of the Imperial Japanese
Army (IJA) at Nomohan (Khalkin-Gol) by Soviet
armor and artillery in August 1939 revealed the
relative technological primitiveness and operational
inflexibility of the IJA as well as the comparative
weakness of Japan’s industrial base.19 In the years
before the war, recounts Gordon Prange, “Americans
assured one another that Japan was virtually bankrupt,
short of raw materials, and hopelessly bogged down in
China. It lagged 100 years behind the times, and in case
of a major conflict, its wheel-barrow economy would
shatter like a teacup hurled against a brick wall.”20
The issue of “rationality” is a false one. Cultures as
disparate as those of the United States and Japan in the
1930s defy a common standard of rationality. Rationality lies in the eyes of the beholder, and “rational” leaders can make horribly mistaken decisions. American examples include the Truman administration’s decision
to cross the 38th Parallel in Korea in 1950, which
witlessly provoked an unnecessary war with China;
the Johnson administration’s decision to commit U.S.
ground combat forces to South Vietnam’s defense in
1965; and the George W. Bush administration’s decision
to invade Iraq in 2003.
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Was Churchill’s decision to fight on after Dunkirk
rational? In May-June 1940 Britain had no means of
effectively challenging Hitler’s domination of Europe.
London had no remaining continental allies (the Soviet
Union was Hitler’s ally from 1939 to 1941), and the
isolationist United States might as well have been on
another planet. Britain’s only hope of survival, and
it was just that—hope—lay in American and Soviet
entry into the war, which in turn depended on the
chance of profound strategic miscalculations by
Germany and Japan. That such miscalculations were
forthcoming in Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union
in June 1941 and Japan’s attack on the United States
in December was, for Churchill, sheer luck. Absent
those monumental blunders, Britain would have been
finished as a European power and perhaps eventually
destroyed by Germany. A “realist” prime minister in
May-June 1940 might have explored the possibility
of a negotiated departure of Britain from the war by
formally accepting German hegemony on the continent
(including British evacuation of Gibraltar) in exchange
for Hitler’s guarantee of the British empire’s integrity.
Indeed, some members of Churchill’s cabinet—notably
Lord Halifax—are known to have favored exploration
of a possible settlement via an approach to Mussolini.21
Fighting on without allies would have been heroic but
futile (one is reminded of Japan’s doomed struggle from
Okinawa to Nagasaki). Sooner or later, the weight of
Germany’s military might, reinforced by its conquests
in Europe (and continued massive deliveries of grain
and other strategically critical raw materials from the
Soviet Union), would have proved decisive.
Japan’s decision for war was made after months of
agonizing internal debate by leaders who recognized
America’s vast industrial superiority and who, in the
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more sober moments, suffered few illusions about
Japan’s chances in a protracted war against America.
Japan’s leaders did not want war with the United
States, but by the fall of 1941 few saw any acceptable
alternative to war. They believed that Japan’s invasion
of British- and Dutch-controlled Southeast Asia would
mean war with the United States, and they resigned
themselves to it. Nor did the United States want
war with Japan. The Roosevelt administration was
committed to stopping Hitler in Europe; engaged in
an undeclared shooting war with Nazi submarines in
the North Atlantic; and wedded to a “Germany-first”
strategy in the event of war with all the Axis powers.
The last thing Roosevelt wanted was a war in the
Pacific. The administration was unwilling to go to war
over China and mistakenly believed that it could deter
or retard a Japanese advance into Southeast Asia via
the retention of powerful naval forces in Hawaii, the
imposition economic sanctions, and the deployment
of long-range bombers to the Philippines. It presumed
realism and rationality on the part of the Japanese and
failed to understand that sanctions it imposed upon
Japan in the summer of 1941 were tantamount to an
act of war. Jonathan Utley observes:
No one during the fall of 1941 wanted war with Japan.
[The] Navy preferred to concentrate on the Atlantic. [The]
Army said it needed a few more months before it would
be ready in the Philippines. [Secretary of State Cordell]
Hull had made the search for peace his primary concern
for months. Roosevelt could see nothing to be gained
by a war with Japan. Hawks such as Acheson, [Interior
Secretary Harold] Ickes, and [Treasury Secretary Henry]
Morgenthau argued that their strong policies would
avoid war, not provoke one.22
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Prange convincingly argued that “No one who has
examined the great mass of historical evidence on
Pearl Harbor can doubt that the United States wanted
to maintain peace with Japan for as long as possible”
because it “wished to remain free to assist Great Britain
and defeat Hitler.”23
Japanese Aggression and U.S. Policy Responses,
1937-41.
The Japanese decision for war against the United
States was the product of Japanese fatalism, racial
arrogance, cultural incomprehension, and strategic
miscalculation. The decision followed (1) four years of
stalemated Japanese aggression in China, (2) Tokyo’s
proclamation in August 1940 of a “Greater East Asian
Co-Prosperity Sphere” that encompassed Southeast
Asia as well as China, Manchuria, and Korea, and (3)
Japan’s entry into a military alliance—the Tripartite
Pact of September 1940—with Nazi Germany and
Fascist Italy. Having annexed Korea in 1910 and seized
Manchuria in 1931, Japan invaded China in 1937. By the
beginning of 1941, Japan had conquered much of north
and central China, seized all of China’s major ports as
well as Hainan Island and the Spratly Islands in the
South China Sea, and established a military presence
in northern French Indochina. Japan was poised to
invade resource-rich Southeast Asia, which Japanese
propagandists had long and loudly proclaimed
was rightfully within Japan’s sphere of influence,
notwithstanding the fact that almost all of Southeast
Asia lay under British, Dutch, French, and American
colonial rule.
The United States had never recognized Japan’s
Manchurian puppet state of Manchukuo and opposed
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Japan’s war in China. The United States recognized
Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang as the legitimate
government of China and provided it financial and
later military assistance. The Roosevelt administration
also rightly regarded the Tripartite Pact as directed
against the United States. Japan’s alliance with Hitler,
which was clearly intended to deter the United States
from going to war with Germany or Japan by raising
the specter of a two-ocean war,24 transformed Japan
from regional threat into a potential extension of
Hitler’s agenda of aggression, especially with respect
to the Soviet Union after the Nazi invasion of June 22,
1941. “No other action could so directly or effectively
have seemed to bear out the contention of the hardline faction in Washington that Japan’s southward
drive was part of a vast Axis plan for world conquest
that would eventually reach America unless she acted
immediately to stop it,” observes Sachiko Murakami.25
Roosevelt viewed the Soviet Union as an indispensable
belligerent against Hitler and took the threat of a
Japanese invasion of Siberia from Manchuria quite
seriously; there is even evidence that he deliberately
stiffened U.S. policy toward Japan in the wake of
Germany’s invasion of Russia for the purpose of
encouraging the Japanese to look south rather than
north.26 “The great question for world leaders in the
first half of 1941 was whether Hitler would attack the
Soviet Union, and the great question in the latter half
was whether he would succeed,” observes Waldo
Heinrichs. “The German-Soviet conflict had a direct
bearing on Japanese-American relations.”27
But the Roosevelt administration also regarded
a Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia, especially the
oil-rich Dutch East Indies and tin- and rubber-rich
British Malaya, as strategically unacceptable. Control
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of Southeast Asia would not only weaken the British
Empire and threaten India, Australia, and New Zealand;
it would also afford Japan access to oil and other
critical raw materials that would reduce its economic
dependence on the United States. The administration,
contends Jonathan Marshall, was wedded to the
“fundamental proposition that the United States and
Britain could not afford to lose the raw material wealth
and the sea lanes of Southeast Asia” even if it meant
war.28 Though the administration was never prepared
to go to war over China, it regarded an extension of
Japan’s empire into Southeast Asia as unacceptable.
Thus Japan provoked a strong American response when
Japanese forces occupied southern French Indochina
in July 1941 as an obvious preliminary to further
southward military moves. (In 1940 the United States
had cracked Japan’s most secret diplomatic code—
known as PURPLE—and was therefore privy to key
foreign ministry traffic regarding Japan’s intentions.)
The United States was prepared to declare economic
war on Japan as a means of deterring—or at least
delaying—a Japanese advance into Southeast Asia,
and that is exactly what the Roosevelt administration
did in July 1941. Roosevelt did not envisage an abrupt
shut down of all U.S. trade with Japan when he signed
the order freezing Japanese assets in the United States
on July 26. As Roosevelt told Secretary of the Interior
Harold Ickes, he intended to use the order’s requirement
that the Japanese obtain export licenses to release frozen
dollars for purchase of any further U.S. products as a
“noose around Japan’s neck” which he would “give
it a jerk now and then.”29 The aim of the asset freeze,
at least in Roosevelt’s mind, “was to avoid provoking
Japan while bringing more and more pressure to
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bear, not only to impede Japan’s war production, but
also to haunt it with the constant threat that more
severe measures might be applied.”30 Thus Roosevelt
intended that oil shipments to Japan continue, albeit in
reduced quantities, because he believed that a complete
embargo could provoke a Japanese attack on the Dutch
East Indies.31 The Roosevelt administration was well
aware that Japan imported 90 percent of its oil, of
which 75-80 percent was from the United States (which
in 1940 accounted for an astounding 63 percent of the
world’s output of petroleum). Roosevelt also knew
that the Dutch East Indies, which produced 3 percent
of the world’s output, was the only other convenient
oil producer that could meet Japan’s import needs.32
The freeze order was the culmination of a program of
sanctioning Japan for its aggression in China that began
in January 1940 with the U.S. withdrawal from its 1911
commercial treaty with Japan (notice of abrogation was
given in July 1939). Sanctioning escalated in July 1940
with the passage of the National Defense Act, which
granted the administration authority to ban or restrict
the export of items declared vital to national defense.
On July 25 Roosevelt announced a ban on Japanese
acquisition of U.S. high-octane aviation gasoline,
certain grades of steel and scrap iron, and some
lubricants. In September the White House imposed
a ban on all scrap iron exports to Japan. Because the
Japanese steel industry was highly dependent on
imported scrap iron from the United States, the ban
compelled Japan to draw down its stockpiles and
operate its steel industry well below capacity; indeed,
the ban blocked any significant expansion of Japanese
steel production during the war.33 In December the
embargo was expanded to include iron ore, steel, and
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steel products, and the following month expanded to
include copper (of which the United States supplied 80
percent of Japan’s requirements), brass, bronze, zinc,
nickel, and potash. “Almost every week thereafter other
items were added to the list, each of which was much
needed for Japanese industrial production.”34 Thus
by July 1941, the United States was already severely
punishing Japan for its continued aggression in China
and adherence to the Tripartite Pact.
By early 1941 the United States had in place an imposing
number of embargoes on the shipment of materials to
Japan, nearly all of them had been justified, and most of
them correctly justified, as measures necessary for the
American rearmament effort. But for this very reason they
had a substantial impact on Japan’s own war economy.
Tokyo’s only source of materials crucial for war—scrap
iron, steel, machine tools, ferroalloys, aluminum—was,
excepting a trickle of supplies from Germany that came
over the transSiberian railroad, the United States.35

But, as Roosevelt understood, it was Japan’s oil
dependency on the United States, a dependency,
ironically, that had deepened with Japan’s expanding
military operations in China, that constituted the real
hangman’s noose around Japan’s neck. Moreover, by
the summer of 1941 it had become politically difficult
for the Roosevelt administration to justify the continued
shipment of a commodity on which the Japanese war
machine was so dependent. American public opinion
was increasingly outraged, as were key members of
Roosevelt’s cabinet, including Secretary of the Interior
Ickes, Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, Secretary
of the Navy Frank Knox, and Secretary of War Henry
Stimson, who believed that the continued shipment of
oil to Japan was a national disgrace.36 (Ickes favored
a preventive war against Japan.37) Thus for State and
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Treasury department hardliners “who saw Japan as
the enemy and economic sanctions as the effective
weapon at hand,” a limited oil embargo was a halfmeasure inviting bureaucratic sabotage.38 Led by State
Department hawks Acheson and Stanley Hornbeck,
head of State’s Far Eastern Division, they believed that
Japan was a paper tiger that would collapse in response
to strong U.S. pressure, and they sought to threaten
Japan’s economic ruin by converting the freeze order
into a complete suspension of trade (including oil)
through their control of the complicated procedures
that compelled Japanese importers to obtain export
licenses from the State Department as well as exchange
permits (to release frozen funds) from the Treasury
Department.39 Both Acheson and Morgenthau had
favored punitive sanctions for years and took advantage
of the freeze order to deny all Japanese requests for
licenses and exchange permits.40
The result, in conjunction with the seizure of Japanese assets by Great Britain and the Netherlands, was a
complete suspension of Japanese economic access to the
United States and the destruction of between 50 and 75
percent of Japan’s foreign trade.41 In early November
1941, Joseph Grew, the U.S. ambassador to Japan,
cabled Secretary of State Hull that “the greater part of
Japanese commerce has been lost, Japanese industrial
production has been drastically curtailed, and Japan’s
national resources have been depleted.” Grew went
on to warn of “an all-out, do-or-die attempt, actually
risking national hara kiri, to make Japan impervious
to economic embargoes abroad rather than to yield to
foreign pressure.”42 Even in retrospect, Acheson, for
his part, claimed that the embargo’s aim was “to limit
Japanese military action in East and Southeast Asia,”
and that though the “danger of provoking Japan to
seize . . . the Dutch East Indies . . . or move against
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us” was recognized, the feeling was that “no rational
Japanese could believe that an attack on us could result
in anything but disaster for his country. Of course,
no one even dimly foresaw the initial success of [the
Japanese] attack [on Pearl Harbor].”43
Roosevelt was much less confident. Neither he
nor U.S. Army Chief of Staff George Marshall nor
U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Harold “Betty” Stark
wanted to force a showdown with Japan. All three
men were preoccupied with the war in Europe and
regarded Nazi Germany as a far greater threat to U.S.
security than Imperial Japan. Marshall, Stark, and
other senior U.S. military leaders favored restraint in
the Pacific,44 whereas Roosevelt wanted the bargaining
leverage of a limited embargo because he believed that
an abrupt shut down of U.S. trade with Japan would
likely provoke a Japanese advance into Southeast Asia,
which would probably mean war. As early as October
1940 Roosevelt told Hull and Under-Secretary of State
Sumner Welles that an oil shut-off would force Japan
to attack the Dutch East Indies, a judgment he repeated
to a White House audience just 2 days after ordering
the freeze of Japanese assets.45 Yet upon discovering,
after his return from the Placentia Bay conference with
Winston Churchill in August, that all oil exports to
Japan had, in fact, been suspended, Roosevelt declined
to reverse the decision. The reasons remain unclear.
Perhaps he believed that a reversal would look like a
retreat, or perhaps he had come to regard a Japanese
advance into Southeast Asia as inevitable. If war was
now a certainty, then a complete embargo would
weaken Japan’s capacity to wage war.46 Roosevelt
was also pursuing a highly-interventionist policy in
Europe for which he needed the support of Stimson,
Morgenthau, Ickes, and other anti-Japanese hardliners;
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he may have felt that he risked alienating the hardliners
by continued lack of decisive intervention against
Japan.47
The culmination of U.S. economic warfare against
Japan by late summer of 1941 confronted Tokyo with
essentially two choices: seizure of Southeast Asia, or
submission to the United States. Economic destitution
and attendant military paralysis would soon become
a reality if Japan did nothing. The embargo was
already beginning to strangle Japanese industry, and
Japan’s stockpiled oil amounted to no more than 1824 months of normal consumption—and substantially
less should Japan mount major military operations in
Southeast Asia.48 As National Planning Board Director
Teiichi Suzuki declared before an Imperial audience
on September 6, 1941:
At this stage our national power with respect to
physical resources has come to depend entirely upon
the productive capacity of the Empire itself, upon that
of Manchuria, China, Indochina . . . and upon vital
materials stockpiled so far. Therefore, as a result of the
present overall economic blockade imposed by Great
Britain and the United States, our Empire’s national
power is declining day by day. Our liquid fuel stockpile,
which is the most important, will reach bottom by June
or July of next year, even if we impose strict wartime
control on civilian demand. Accordingly, I believe it
is vitally important for the survival of our Empire that
we make up our minds to establish and stabilize a firm
economic base.49

Two months later, at another conference of Japanese
leaders, Prime Minister Hideki Tojo warned that “Two
years from now we will have no petroleum for military
use. Ships will stop moving . . . . We can talk about
austerity and suffering, but can our people endure
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such a life for a long time? . . . I fear that we would
become a third-class nation after 2 or 3 years if we just
sat tight.”50
Yet the price the Americans demanded for lifting
the embargo and restoring U.S.-Japanese trade to
some semblance of normality was no more acceptable:
abandonment of empire. The Roosevelt administration
demanded that Japan not only terminate its membership
in the Tripartite Alliance, but also withdraw its
military forces from both China and Indochina, and
by extension, the Japanese feared, Manchuria (after all,
the United States had refused to recognize the Japanese
puppet state of Manchukuo). Abandonment of China
and Indochina would have compelled Japan to write
off its hard-won gains on the Asian mainland since
1937 and drop any hope of becoming the dominant
power in East Asia. For Japan, a major reason for
establishing an empire in East Asia was to free itself of
the very kind of humiliating economic dependency on
the United States that the embargo represented. And
what was to stop the Americans from coercing further
territorial concessions from the Japanese, including
withdrawal from Manchuria and even Korea and
Formosa? Japan “could not accept any interim solution
that left it dependent on American largesse” or any
deal that left it in a position of “continued reliance
on the whims of Washington. The possibility that
the Americans might supply Japan with just enough
oil, steel, and other materials to maintain a starveling
existence was intolerable to any Japanese statesman.”51
Consider the assessment of Yoshimichi Hara, President
of the Imperial Privy Council (composed of Japan’s expremiers), on the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack:
If we were to give in, we would give up in one stroke not
only our gains in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese
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wars, but also the benefits of the Manchurian Incident.
This we cannot do. We are loathe to compel our people to
suffer even greater hardships, on top of what they have
endured during the four years since the China Incident.
But it is clear that the existence of our country is being
threatened, that the great achievements of the Emperor
Meiji would all come to naught, and that there is nothing
else we can do.52

The United States was, in effect, demanding that
Japan renounce its status as an aspiring great power
and consign itself to permanent strategic dependency
on a hostile Washington. Such a choice would have
been unacceptable to any great power. Japan’s survival
as a major industrial and military power was a stake—
far more compelling reasons for war than the United
States later advanced for its disastrous wars of choice
in Vietnam and Iraq. Would the United States ever
have permitted a hostile power to wreck its foreign
commerce and strangle its domestic economy without
a resort to war?
If the United States had been faced with a similar boycott
which equally endangered its future, few Americans
would have questioned the propriety of waging a major
war to restore the prerequisites of American survival. . . .
A body blow of this caliber could have driven multitudes
beyond even caring about “winability.” National selfrespect and even the quest for naked vengeance . . .
would have reinforced necessity and swept aside any
objections. If the United States would have launched a
preemptive war under such circumstances, why is it so
surprising that the Japanese did so?53

The American campaign of economic warfare
culminating in the total embargo of U.S. trade with
Japan in the late summer of 1941 made sense only as a
defense measure—i.e., as a means of weakening Japan
in anticipation of inevitable war. It could never have
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succeeded as a deterrent to war because the Japanese,
with considerable reason, regarded the embargo as an
act of war mandating a response in kind.
Roberta Wohlstetter contended that, for Japan, “war
with the United States was not chosen. The decision for
war was rather forced by the desire to avoid the terrible
alternative of losing status or abandoning [its] national
objectives.”54 The historian Akira Iriye has written of
the oil embargo that it:
had a tremendous psychological impact upon the
Japanese. The ambivalence and ambiguities in their
perception of world events disappeared, replaced by
a sense of clear-cut alternatives. Hitherto they had not
confronted the stark choice between war and peace as
an immediate prospect and had lived in a climate of
uncertainty from day to day. Now, with the United
States resorting to decisive measures, that phase passed.
Any wishful thinking that America would tolerate the
invasion of southern Indochina was dissipated; either
Japan would stay in Southeast Asia at the risk of war
with the Anglo-American countries or it would retreat
to conciliate them. The military judged that it was too
late for conciliation; Japan would now have to consider
the likelihood of war, with the United States as its major
adversary.55

Ian Kershaw contends that “For no faction of the
Japanese elites could there be a retreat from the goals
of a victorious settlement in China and successful
expansion to establish . . . Japanese domination of
the Far East.” These objectives “had not just become
an economic imperative. They reflected honour and
national pride, the prestige and standing of a great
power. The alternatives were seen as not just poverty,
but defeat, humiliation, ignominy, and an end to
great power status in permanent subordination to the
United States.”56 Indeed, better to die fighting than
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to capitulate. “[S]ince Japan is unavoidably facing
national ruin whether it decides to fight the United
States or submit to its demands, it must by all means
choose to fight,” declared Admiral Osami Nagano,
the Chief of Staff of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN),
at an Imperial Conference in September 1941. “Japan
would rather go down fighting than ignobly surrender
without a struggle, because surrender would spell
spiritual as well as physical ruin for the nation and its
destiny.”57
War—even a lost war—was clearly preferable
to humiliation and starvation. Seizure of the Dutch
East Indies and British possessions in Southeast Asia
(Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei, and British
North Borneo) offered Japan the only alternative to oil
and other resource dependence on the United States.
It also meant certain war with Great Britain and the
Netherlands, and probably war with the United States.
Neither the British nor the Dutch were in a position
to defend their Southeast Asian possessions, however,
and the United States was preoccupied with events
in Europe. Could the Japanese move into Southeast
Asia without provoking war with the United States?
Japanese leaders were initially divided on this question,
but finally concluded that even a southward military
advance that avoided attacks on the Philippines
and other American targets almost certainly would
provoke an armed U.S. response and therefore that
it was imperative to strike the first blow. Even if
Japan’s advance did not provoke war, an untouched
Philippines (and U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor)
would constitute an unacceptable potential military
threat along the eastern flank of Japan’s southward
advance. IJN leaders were particularly insistent that
the United States and Great Britain were strategically
inseparable, and that Washington would go to war
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with Japan if Japan went to war with Great Britain.58
Additionally, by this time many Japanese leaders had
come to believe that war with the United States was
inevitable, and there seemed to be no appreciation of
the difficulties Roosevelt would have confronted in
securing a congressional declaration of war in response
to a Japanese attack only on British and Dutch colonial
possessions in Southeast Asia.
By the end of the 1930s [Japan’s] international
intransigence and naked military aggression had
created a situation in which the survival of Japan as a
great power, and of her conception of an Asian empire,
did indeed hang in the balance. By the fall of 1941 the
question had come to be not whether there was to be
a war with the Western powers, including the latently
powerful United States, but, given the regional and
world situation, whether there would ever come a more
favorable time to solve Japan’s resource problems by
military action.59

Japanese Assumptions.
The Japanese brought several beliefs, or assumptions, to their consideration of war with the United
States. Some were realistic, others not, and the line between reasonable expectation and wishful thinking was
often blurred. The first assumption was that time was
working against Japan—i.e., the longer Japan waited
to initiate war against the United States, the dimmer
its prospects for success. This assumption was grimly
realistic. As the embargo took hold and the United
States accelerated its rearmament, Japan’s economic
and military power vis-à-vis that of the United States
began to rapidly decline. In the critical category of naval
tonnage, Japan in late 1941 possessed a competitive 70
percent of total U.S. naval tonnage (including tonnage
24

deployed in the Atlantic), but the Japanese correctly
projected, based on existing naval building programs
(and excluding estimated losses), that the ratio would
drop to 65 percent in 1942, 50 percent in 1943, and 30
percent in 1944.60 The Two-Ocean Navy Act passed by
Congress in July 1940 called for a 70 percent increase in
U.S. naval tonnage, including construction of 18 aircraft
carriers, 6 battleships, 33 cruisers, 115 destroyers, and
43 submarines.61 H. P. Willmott has observed that
the act “doomed the Imperial Navy to second-class
status, since the activities of American shipyards
would be as catastrophic for Japanese aspirations as
a disastrous naval battle would be.”62 Yamamoto had
warned Japanese leaders: “Anyone who has seen the
auto factories in Detroit and the oil fields in Texas
knows that Japan lacks the national power for a naval
race with America.”63 Japan’s relative naval strength
would never be better than in 1941. Indeed, during the
war years the United States built 8,812 naval vessels
to Japan’s 589.64 A month before Pearl Harbor, Army
Chief of Staff Hajime Sugiyama warned that “the ratio
of armament between Japan and the United States
will become more unfavorable to us as time passes;
and particularly, the gap in air armament will enlarge
rapidly.”65 In 1941 the United States produced 1,400
combat aircraft to Japan’s 3,200; 3 years later, the
United States built 37,500 to Japan’s 8,300.66
Thus the oil embargo drove the Japanese into the
logic of preventive war: given war’s inevitability and
our declining military power relative to the enemy’s,
Japanese leaders reasoned, better war now than later.
However poor Japan’s chances of defeating the United
States, they were better in 1941 than in any coming
year. At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, the Pacific
Ocean warship balance between Japan and the United
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States was 10:8 in battleships, 10:3 in aircraft carriers,
18:13 in heavy cruisers, 20:11 in light cruisers, 112:80 in
destroyers, and 65:56 in submarines.67
A second and equally realistic assumption was that
Japan had little chance of winning a protracted war with
the United States. America’s great material superiority
would eventually bury Japan. If Japan had any chance
of fighting a war with the United States to some kind of
successful conclusion, it had to bring military operations
to a head as soon as possible. As Yamamoto had warned
Prime Minister Konoe in the fall of 1940, “if I am told
to ‘go at it,’ you will see me run wild for half a year,
maybe a year. But I have no confidence whatsoever
when it comes to 2 years, 3 years.”68 Admiral Osami
Nagano, the IJN’s chief of staff, clearly understood that
a protracted war benefited the United States. Indeed,
he believed that “the probability is very high that
they [the United States] will from the outset plan on a
prolonged war. Therefore it will be necessary for us to
be reconciled to this and to be prepared militarily for
a long war.” He hoped that the United States would
“aim for a quick war leading to an early decision,
send[ing] their principal naval units [into the Western
Pacific], and challeng[ing] us to an immediate war,”
but he feared that “America will attempt to prolong
the war, using her impregnable position, her superior
industrial power, and her abundant resources.”69
Neither Nagano nor any other Japanese leader offered
a practical alternative to fighting a war on American
terms. Short-war Japan was going to pick a fight with a
long-war enemy.
Given the expectation of a long war with the United
States, how did Japan expect to survive? Did Japanese
leaders have a theory of victory, or at least of defeatavoidance? Japan was not strong enough to threaten
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the American homeland, but was not the war going to
be fought in East Asia and the Western Pacific, which
the Japanese controlled or would soon control (after
Tokyo’s conquest of Southeast Asia)? Might Tokyo be
able to fight the United States to a bloody stalemate
on the Japanese side of the Pacific and extract from
that stalemate some kind of political settlement with
Washington that would preserve Japan’s core imperial
interests on the Asian mainland?
These questions point to a third Japanese
assumption, or at least hope: namely, that by swiftly
seizing and fortifying the Central and Southwestern
Pacific, the Japanese could force the Americans
into a murderous, island-by-island slog that would
eventually exhaust their political will to fight on to
total victory. Japan would raise the blood and treasure
costs of the war beyond Washington’s willingness to
pay.70 “The Japanese theory of victory,” contends Colin
Gray, “amounted to the hope—one hesitates to say
calculation—that the United States would judge the cost
of defeating Japan to be too heavy, too disproportionate
to the worth of the interests at stake.”71
This “strategy” was expressed in a document
prepared by the Japanese military leadership for
the critical Imperial Conference of September 6.
The document, “The Essentials for Carrying Out the
Empire’s Policies,” presented a series of questions and
answers, one of which was: What is the outlook in a war
with Great Britain and the United States; particularly, how
shall we end the war? The answer:
A war with the United States and Great Britain will be long,
and will become a war of endurance. It is very difficult
to predict the termination of war, and it would be wellnigh impossible to expect the surrender of the United
States. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that
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the war may end because of a great change in American
public opinion, which may result from such factors as
the remarkable success of our military operations in the
South [Southeast Asia] or the surrender of Great Britain.
At any rate, we should be able to establish an invincible
position: by building up a strategically advantageous
position through the occupation of important areas
in the South; by creating an economy that will be selfsufficient in the long run through the development
of rich resources in the Southern regions, as well as
through the use of the economic power of the East Asian
continent; and by linking Asia and Europe in destroying
the Anglo-American coalition through our cooperation
with Germany and Italy. Meanwhile, we may hope that
we will be able to influence the trend of affairs and bring
the war to an end.72

Nagano believed that,
If we take the South, we will be able to strike a strong
blow against American resources of national defense.
That is, we will build an iron wall, and within it we will
destroy, one by one, the enemy states in Asia; and in
addition, we will defeat America and Britain. If Britain
is defeated, Americans will have to do some thinking.
When we are asked what will happen in five years from
now, it is natural that we should not know, whether it is
in military operations, politics, or diplomacy.73

Nagano believed Japan could convert the Southwestern
Pacific into an “impregnable” bastion, “laying the
basis for protracted operations” that would exhaust
U.S. will.74 Adrian Lewis believes this best explains the
Japanese determination to wage a “hopeless” resistance
in the Central Pacific from 1943 to 1945:
While the Marines fought some very difficult and bloody
battles in places such as Tarawa and Iwo Jima, there was,
in fact, no way for them to lose. The Japanese had no way
to reinforce, no way to resupply, no way to evacuate,
no way to equal the firepower of the U.S. Navy, and
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frequently no air power. The Japanese literally had no
way to win or survive . . . .The Japanese recognized their
fate. They well understood the futility of their situation.
However, their objective was not to achieve victory in the
traditional sense. Their objective was to inflict as many
casualties as possible on American forces, to hold out as
long as possible, and to prolong the war. The Japanese
believed they could destroy the will of the American
people.75

Underlying the Japanese belief that they could bleed
the Americans into a political settlement short of total
victory—a belief that persisted among the Japanese
military leadership well into 1945, was a fourth
assumption: Japanese racial and spiritual superiority
could neutralize America’s material superiority. Japan
was neither the first nor the last of America’s enemies to
stress the superiority of the human element of war and
to underestimate the resolve of Americans at war. The
Japanese were fully aware of their industrial weakness
vis-à-vis the United States; they had long believed,
however, that the unique qualities of their race, including a superior national will, discipline, and warfighting prowess, could defeat the strong but soft Americans. “The Japanese regarded us as a decadent nation in which pacifism and isolationism practically
ruled the policy of our government,” testified Ambassador Grew after the war.76 In December 1939 Grew had
warned that attempts to defeat Japan via economic
sanctions ignored Japanese psychology. “Japan is
a nation of hardy warriors, still inculcated with the
samurai do-or-die spirit which has by tradition and
inheritance become ingrained in the race.” Grew went
on to note that the “Japanese throughout their history
have faced periodic cataclysms brought about by nature
and by man: earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, epidemics,
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the blighting of crops, and almost constant wars within
and without the country. By long experience they are
inured to hardship . . . and to regimentation.”77
H. P. Willmott points out that modern Japan was, in
1941, “a nation with no experience of defeat and, more
importantly, a nation [that believed itself] created by
gods, and ruled by a god. . . . This religious dimension
provided the basis for the belief in the superiority of
the Japanese martial commitment . . . that was the
guarantee against national defeat.”78 As for America,
many Japanese shared the view of Rear Admiral Tasuku
Nakazawa, chief of the IJA’s operations section: “a
composite nation of immigrants [which] lacked unity,
could not withstand adversity and privations, and
regarded war as a form of sport, so that if we deal a
severe blow at the outset of hostilities they would lose
the will to fight.”79 Indeed, as John Dower observes, in
Japanese eyes,
all Westerners were assumed to be selfish and egoistic,
and incapable of mobilizing for a long fight in a
distant place. All the “Western” values which Japanese
ideologues and militarists had been condemning since
the 1930s, after all, were attacked because they were said
to sap the nation’s strength and collective will. More
concretely, it was assumed that Great Britain would fall
to the Germans, and the United States war effort would be
undercut by any number of debilitating forces endemic
to contemporary America’s isolationist sentiment, labor
agitation, racial strife, political factionalism, capitalistic
or “plutocratic” profiteering, and so on.80

As a creature-comforted capitalist society, America
was simply too soft to sustain the blood and treasure
burdens of a long, harsh war, and at some point the
capitalists who controlled the United States would turn
against a war whose balance sheet was registering far
more costs than benefits.
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Japan’s industrial poverty relative to that of the
Soviet Union and the United States encouraged an
embrace of spiritual power over material strength. Even
after its punishing defeat at Nomohan, which should
have alerted the IJA to the perils of warring with an
industrial giant like the United States, the IJA’s:
operational thinking remained essentially primitive,
unscientific, complacent, narrow, and simplistic.
Reaffirmation of faith in moral attributes and
psychological factors amounted to callous evasion of
the realities of modern firepower, mechanization, and
aviation. The rationale was that the quantity and quality
of the material possessed by Japan’s enemies—and
their sheer numbers—could only be offset by intangible
factors such as high morale, spirit, and fearlessness in
close fighting against men and armor. At Nomohan
and throughout the Pacific War, the price was paid in
lives squandered in desperate banzai charges with the
bayonet, though it was well known that frontal assaults
had rarely succeeded since the days of the RussoJapanese War.81

Japanese illusions about “American decadence and
effeteness and their failure to appreciate [America’s]
self-confidence and absolutist view of war rooted in the
liberal tradition,” observes Richard Betts, “facilitated
the miscalculation that Washington would make the
cost-benefit calculations Tokyo hoped: accept limited
war and sue for peace after severe initial setbacks and
the establishment of a Japanese perimeter in the Pacific
that would be costly to crack.”82
Japanese Decisionmaking.
Scott Sagan, in his assessment of the Japanese
decision for war against the United States, believes
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that the “persistent theme of Japanese irrationality is
highly misleading, for, using the common standard
in the literature (a conscious calculation to maximize
utility based on a consistent value system), the
Japanese decision for war appears to have been
rational.” Sagan goes on to point out that upon close
examination of the decisions made in Tokyo in 1941,
“one finds not a thoughtless rush to national suicide,
but rather a prolonged, agonizing debate between
two repugnant alternatives.”83 The decisions were
made by a small group of senior civilian officials and
IJA and IJN officers, all of whom were committed to
Japan’s continued imperial expansion, regarded the
United States as the main obstacle to that expansion,
and opposed making any significant concessions to the
United States. The main decisionmaking venue was the
Liaison Conference, of which 56 meetings pertaining to
the decision for war were held from April 18 through
December 4, 1941.84 The conferences brought together
representatives of the Cabinet—the prime minister,
the foreign minister, the war minister (a serving IJA
officer), the navy minister (a serving IJN officer), and
sometimes other ministers of state—and the army
and navy chiefs of staff and vice chiefs of staff. Major
policy decisions reached at Liaison Conferences were
forwarded to Imperial Conferences for pro forma
approval by the Emperor. Attendees at an Imperial
Conference, which met in the presence of the Emperor,
who almost always remained silent, included members
of the Liaison Conference along with the President
of the Privy Council, who served as the Emperor’s
spokesman.85 It is testimony to the Emperor’s limited
influence that while he was personally against war with
the United States and managed to delay the decision
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for war for 6 weeks, he “eventually succumbed to the
persistent pressure of the military bureaucracy and
accepted its argument that war with the United States
was inevitable and possibly winnable.”86
Military opinion necessarily dominated Liaison
Conference discussions and decisions, given that
six of the eight principals were serving officers; war
minister Hideki Tojo made it seven when he became
prime minister in October 1941, a position he held
until 1944. The Liaison Conferences also reveal a
refusal to confront openly the possibility of defeat and
its probable consequences, and a pervasive fatalistic
belief that Japan’s destiny was in the hands of forces
beyond the control of Japanese decisionmakers.87
There were also sharp divisions between IJA and IJN
representatives over timing and methods, but they
all shared the same basic values, including a belief in
death before dishonor. The IJN leadership had a much
greater knowledge of the United States and respect
for its power than did the IJA leadership. Nagano,
Yamamoto, and other senior naval officers had spent
considerable time in the United States; in fact, half of
all IJN officers with the rank of captain or above had
served abroad, most of them in Britain or the United
States.88 In contrast, Tojo and other senior IJA officers
were fixated upon the war in China and had long
regarded Russia as Japan’s principal enemy. The IJA
had no plans or strategy for a war against the United
States and never made any real attempt to evaluate the
United States as an enemy.89 Indeed, the IJA leadership
believed that war with the United States was the navy’s
responsibility. “So long as the navy failed to declare
unequivocally that there was no chance of victory
[against the United States], the army saw no reason to
concern itself with the problem.”90 This extraordinarily
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casual attitude toward the United States, an enemy for
which the IJA had performed no military assessment
or drafted a war plan, was the product in part of the
army’s utter preoccupation with its responsibilities on
the Asian mainland. At the time of the Pearl Harbor
attack, the army had 700,000 troops in Manchuria (for a
possible invasion of Siberia) and had already sustained
180,000 dead and 425,000 wounded in the China war;
only 11 of its 51 divisions were available for operations
in Southeast Asia.91
Perhaps the most important conference of the year
was the Imperial Conference of July 2, 1941. At this
conference the Emperor sanctioned army and navy
plans to acquire bases in southern French Indochina, a
move which explicitly postponed consideration of war
with the Soviet Union and greatly increased the risk
of war with the United States.92 The German invasion
of Russia on June 22 had persuaded Foreign Minister
Yosuke Matsuoka and Privy Council President
Yoshimichi Hara, among others, that Japan should
strike northward, into the Soviet Far East, before moving
southward into Southeast Asia. The “war between
Germany and the Soviet Union represents the chance
of a lifetime for Japan,” argued Hara. “Since the Soviet
Union is promoting Communism around the world, we
will have to attack her sooner or later. . . . Our Empire
wants to avoid going to war with Great Britain and the
United States while we are engaged in a war with the
Soviet Union. . . . [so] I want to see the Soviet Union
attacked on this occasion.”93 Proponents of a southward
advance first prevailed, however, leaving an attack on
Russia for later consideration. U.S. economic sanctions
were beginning to bite hard, and there was nothing to
stop the Americans from imposing additional sanctions,
including an oil embargo. Moreover, Japanese military
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intelligence was not persuaded that Germany would
swiftly defeat the Soviet Union. The conquest of
Southeast Asia would afford Japan control over the oil
of the Dutch East Indies as well as the tin and rubber of
Malaya and southern Indochina; it would also isolate
the Nationalist Government in China from any further
Western assistance. The Siberian option could wait.
The policy document approved at the Imperial
Conference of July 2, “Outline of National Policies in
View of the Changing Situation,” was quite clear on
the implications for Japanese-American relations: “In
order to achieve the objectives [of defeating China and
securing control of Southeast Asia], preparations for
war with Great Britain and the United States will be
made. . . . our Empire will not be deterred by the possibility
of being involved in a war with Great Britain and the United
States.”94 Thus the momentous decision to go south—
to occupy southern Indochina as a preparatory step
to a military advance into Southeast Asia—was taken
before the Roosevelt administration’s imposition of an
oil embargo. Indeed, as we have seen, the embargo was
a response to that decision. The Japanese decision to go
south was made against the backdrop of escalating U.S.
economic warfare against Tokyo and the legitimate
Japanese fear that harsher sanctions were in the offing,
though the abruptness and scope of the asset freeze still
came as a shock. For Japanese leaders, many of them
now persuaded that war with the United States was
inevitable, the decision was an economic insurance
policy against a complete shut-down of Western trade
triggered by the July 26 freeze of Japanese assets in the
United States.
At the Imperial Conference on September 6, both IJN
Chief of Staff Nagano and IJA Chief of Staff Sugiyama
conceded that a war with the United States would
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likely be prolonged, but they also contended that the
U.S. embargo had made war necessary, and the sooner,
the better, because Japan’s national defense capability
was declining vis-à-vis that of the United States.95 In
a series of questions and answers prepared for the
Emperor by the War and Navy ministries entitled “The
Essentials for Carrying Out the Empire’s Policies,” the
proponents of war declared that “the policies of Japan
and the United States are mutually incompatible; it
is historically inevitable that the conflict between the
two countries . . . will ultimately lead to war.” The
document went on the assert that “Even if we should
make concessions to the United States by giving up part
of our national policy for the sake of temporary peace,
the United States, its military position strengthened, is
sure to demand more and more concessions on our part;
and ultimately our empire will have to lie prostrate at
the feet of the United States.”96 The objective of war
was clear:
to expel the influence of [the United States, Great Britain,
and the Netherlands] from East Asia, to establish a sphere
for the self-defense and self-preservation of our Empire,
and to build a New Order in Greater East Asia. In other
words, we aim to establish a close and inseparable
relationship in military, political, and economic affairs
between our Empire and the countries of the Southern
Region, to achieve our Empire’s self-defense and selfpreservation.97

The final decisions for war were made at the
Liaison Conference of November 1 and the Imperial
Conference of November 5. At the Liaison Conference
a deadline for military action was set at the beginning
of December absent a diplomatic breakthrough by
November 30.98 This deadline was reaffirmed at the
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Imperial Conference, which also established a set of
Japanese negotiating demands which the Roosevelt
administration could not possibly accept, thus
making war truly inevitable in early December 1941.
The demands included noninterference in Japan’s
war against China; restoration of pre-embargo trade
relations; a promise to supply Japan’s petroleum needs;
and cooperation in obtaining assured Japanese access
to the resources of the Dutch East Indies. In exchange,
Japan was prepared to foreswear an armed advance
into Southeast Asia, except French Indochina.99
Planning and training for the attack on Pearl
Harbor began in early 1941, when Admiral Yamamoto
became commander-in-chief of Japan’s Combined
Fleet. The final operational plan itself was approved
at the September 6 Imperial Conference, and elements
of Admiral Chuichi Nagumo’s Pearl Harbor strike
force began departing Kure Naval Base on November
10. Ironically, given the strategic consequences of the
decision for war with the United States, the attack on
Pearl Harbor was much less militarily effective than
it could—and should—have been. None of the U.S.
Pacific Fleet’s three aircraft carriers was present at
Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and of the eight
mostly over-aged battleships at Pearl, only two (the
Arizona and Oklahoma) were destroyed beyond repair;
the rest were refloated, repaired, and returned to
wartime service. The same was true of the three light
cruisers and four destroyers damaged in the attack.
All U.S. heavy cruisers and submarines, and most U.S.
destroyers, escaped any damage. Moreover, most of
the 155 U.S. combat aircraft destroyed in Hawaii were
replaced from the United States mainland within a
matter of weeks.100 Worse still for the Japanese was
their failure to destroy Pearl Harbor as a functioning
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naval base. (The attack was directed against the fleet,
not the harbor.) Shore installations, including machine
shops and the tremendous oil storage facility adjacent
to Pearl Harbor, were left pretty much intact, which
permitted the U.S. Navy to continue to operate from
Pearl Harbor. Gordon Prange believed that Nagumo’s
failure to “pulverize the Pearl Harbor base” and “to
seek out and sink America’s carriers” was Japan’s “first
and probably greatest strategic error of the entire Pacific
conflict.”101 The destruction of Pearl Harbor or the
invasion and occupation of the Hawaiian Islands would
have compelled the Navy to operate from the American
West Coast, adding another 3,000 miles of distance to
be surmounted before grappling with the Japanese in
the Central and Southwestern Pacific. After the war,
Minoru Genda, the brilliant Japanese naval aviator
who planned the details of the attack on Pearl Harbor,
lamented the Japanese failure to invade Hawaii, which
he blamed on the IJA’s preoccupation with eventual
war against the Soviet Union and unwillingness to
release (from Manchuria) the divisions necessary to
take Hawaii. “After the attack on Pearl Harbor,” he
said, “we could have taken Honolulu pretty easily.
This would have deprived the American Navy of its
best island base in the Pacific [and] would have cut
the lifeline to Australia, and that country might have
fallen to us like a ripe plum.”102 Japanese possession
of Hawaii and Australia would have deprived the
United States of the indispensable base from which to
challenge Japanese control of Southeast Asia.
Yet Yamamoto’s objective in the Pearl Harbor attack
was limited: to knock out the U.S. Pacific Fleet for at
least 6 months so that Japan could conquer Southeast
Asia without American naval interference. Pearl
Harbor was essentially a flanking raid in support of
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the main event, which was Tokyo’s southward move
against Malaya, Singapore, the Philippines, and the
Dutch East Indies. The possibility of occupying Hawaii
was never seriously considered by either Yamamoto or
the IJN’s general staff.
John Mueller has called the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor a “military inconvenience” for the United
States and a “political and strategic disaster” for Japan
because it instantly galvanized American public
opinion behind a total war effort that led to Japan’s
destruction.103 At one stroke, Pearl Harbor demolished
powerful isolationist opposition to Roosevelt’s interventionist foreign policy and ensured the eventual
defeat of the Axis powers.
Failed Deterrence.
The Roosevelt administration attempted to deter
Japanese expansion into Southeast Asia via three
actions: (1) redeployment of most of the U.S. Fleet from
southern California to Pearl Harbor in the spring of
1940; (2) imposition of economic sanctions, culminating
in the oil embargo of July 1941; and (3) a last-minute
attempt to strengthen U.S. military power Southeast
Asia, capped by the deployment to the Philippines
of new-production B-17 long-range bombers (and
Britain’s agreed dispatch of additional warships to
the Pacific). The California-based U.S. Fleet, slated to
be subdivided into the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets in
February 1941, was on maneuvers in Hawaiian waters
when Roosevelt ordered it to remain in Pearl Harbor,
believing that its open-ended presence there could
deter a potential Japanese move into Southeast Asia.104
The decision to retain the fleet in Hawaii, which was
strongly opposed by fleet commander Admiral J. O.
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Richardson (whom Roosevelt replaced with Admiral
Husband Kimmel), exposed the fleet to the very
attack the Japanese launched on December 7, 1941.
Intended as a deterrent, the fleet became a magnet.
As Yamamoto remarked to a colleague, the “fact that
[the United States] has brought a great fleet to Hawaii
to show us that it’s within striking distance of Japan
means, conversely, that we’re within striking distance
too. In trying to intimidate us, America has put itself in
a vulnerable position. If you ask me, they’re just that
bit too confident.”105
The decision to reinforce the Philippines, which
reversed a policy that had written off their defense
because of the long-standing judgment that the islands
were certain to be quickly captured by the Japanese
in the event of war, was driven by an unwarranted
confidence: first, on the part of General Douglas
MacArthur (recalled by Roosevelt to active duty and
commander-in-chief of U.S. forces in the Far East) in
the defense of the Philippines, and second, on the part
of Stimson and Marshall in the deterrent value of a few
dozen B-17s based in the Philippines.106 The Japanese
were not impressed. They attacked the Philippines a
few hours after Pearl Harbor and destroyed most of the
islands’ B-17 force on the ground. The hasty decision to
build up U.S. forces in Southeast Asia “was a disastrous
strategic miscalculation for the United States, because
the belief that a scratch force of American bombers
and a few British warships could be transformed
into a ‘big stick’ that would force the Japanese to halt
their advance southward was a gamble doomed to
failure,” contends Edwin Layton. On the contrary, by
“embarking on a deterrent policy before the military
forces were installed in the Philippines to make it
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credible, Britain and the United States succeeded in
making the concept of a preemptive strike an attractive
option to the Japanese.”107
Obviously, the United States failed to deter the
Japanese, who preferred the horrendous risks of war
with the United States over a humiliating retreat from
empire. Those within the Roosevelt administration
who believed the Japanese would not go to war with
the United States were wrong. So, too, were those
who believed the United States could deter a Japanese
advance into Southeast Asia via such measures as a
significant “forward” U.S. naval presence in Hawaii,
economic sanctions, and B-17s in the Philippines.
The United States sought to stop Japan without a
war, but ended up provoking war. At no point in
1941 did Roosevelt threaten war; he did not want
war with Japan, and he undoubtedly recognized that
“[n]o unequivocal warning could be given” because he
“could not be sure of American reaction in the event of
actual crisis.” Roosevelt was “fully aware of the need
to secure congressional approval for war, the strength
of isolationist sentiment in the United States, and of the
difficulties [of] demonstrating that a [Japanese] attack
on British and Dutch colonies [in Southeast Asia] was
a direct threat American interests.”108
If the administration was prepared to go to war over
a Japanese advance into Southeast Asia, it should have
made that fact plain to Tokyo. Yet Roosevelt never did
so. At the Placentia Bay Conference of August 1941,
from which the Atlantic Charter was proclaimed, the
British proposed identical parallel Anglo-American
declarations to Tokyo, warning that “Any further
encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific
would produce a situation in which the United States
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Government [His Majesty’s Government] would be
compelled to take counter measures even though these
might lead to war between the United States, [Great
Britain], and Japan.”109 Churchill did not believe there
was much chance of stopping Japanese aggression in
Southeast Asia short of a clear-cut threat of war by the
United States and Great Britain, but was unprepared
to issue such a threat except in conjunction with
Roosevelt. But Roosevelt was unwilling to go that far.
Yet it was:
never clear what progressive economic pressure and
the retention of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor were
supposed to do. Roosevelt did not intend these as
measures preparatory for actual war; he did want them
to restrain Tokyo. But if the United States meant to
deter Japan from taking steps regarded as threatening,
it ought to have been issuing far clearer warnings, as
the amazement of Tokyo at the asset freeze attests. If
Washington hoped to hinder Japan’s ability to make war
whether as a hedge in case conflict came or to block the
conquest of the southwestern Pacific and capitulation of
Chiang’s regime [in China], gradual pressure was a poor
road to take.110

A few days before the attack on Pearl Harbor,
Roosevelt did make a solid pledge to the British
ambassador in Washington that the United States
would go to war in response to a Japanese attack on
British or Dutch territory in Southeast Asia, a pledge
that capped increasingly firm verbal assurances
beginning in July.111 Roosevelt had believed, at least
since the formation of the so-called Axis alliance (the
Tripartite Pact), that Japan and Germany were closely
coordinating their agendas of aggression. (They were
not. The Germans did not inform the Japanese of their
planned attack on the Soviet Union, with which Japan
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had recently signed a nonaggression pact, and the
Japanese did not alert the Germans to their planned
attack on Pearl Harbor.) Roosevelt also believed that
the survival of Britain’s empire in Asia was essential to
Britain’s ability to continue fighting Germany and Italy
in Europe. Yet he never indicated to anyone, including
the British ambassador, how he thought he could
obtain a declaration of war against Japan in response
to a Japanese advance into Southeast Asia limited to
European colonies. What if the Japanese had attacked
only Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies,
leaving the Philippines and Hawaii alone? Could
Roosevelt have persuaded Congress to go to war on
behalf of European colonies in Asia? (On August 12,
the House of Representatives had voted to extend the
Selective Service Act by a single vote; but for that one
vote, the U.S. Army would have largely disintegrated.)
Roosevelt speechwriter Robert Sherwood, who believed that Roosevelt and General George Marshall
“were far more afraid of the isolationists at home . . .
than they were of the enemies abroad,”112 described
Roosevelt’s dilemma in his Pulitzer Prize-winning
biography of Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins:
The Japanese were about to strike at British or Dutch
possessions or both—and what could we do about it?
The British and the Dutch were hopelessly unable to
defend themselves and so were the exposed Dominions
of Australia and New Zealand. . . . Without formidable
American intervention, the Japanese would be able
to conquer and exploit an empire, rich in resources,
stretching from the Aleutian Islands to India or even to
the Middle East; and it was idle to assume, and Roosevelt
knew it better than anyone else, that there could be any
formidable American intervention without the full,
final, irrevocable plunging of the entire nation into
war. And what were the chances of that [if the Japanese
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struck only the British and the Dutch]? What would the
President have to say to the Congress in that event? . . .
Why . . . should Americans die for . . . such outposts
of British imperialism as Singapore or Hong Kong or of
Dutch imperialism in the East Indies?113

Hopkins recalled several talks with Roosevelt during
the year before Pearl Harbor in which Roosevelt
expressed concern that “the tactics of the Japanese
would be to avoid conflict with us; that they would
not attack either the Philippines or Hawaii but would
move on Thailand, French Indo-China, [and] make
further inroads on China itself and attack the Malay
Straits.” Hopkins then recalled Roosevelt’s subsequent
“relief” that the Japanese had attacked U.S. territory.
“In spite of the disaster at Pearl Harbor and the blitzwarfare with the Japanese during the first few weeks,
it completely solidified the American people and made
the war upon Japan inevitable.”114
A Japanese attack on American territory somewhere
in the Pacific was the only event that could elicit a
congressional declaration of war, and Roosevelt,
unlike later presidents, respected the Congress’s
constitutional prerogative to declare war. It was also
necessary that the attack appear unprovoked to the
American people. Stimson testified in 1946 that such an
attack was necessary to unite the country behind any
war with Japan. Even though by late November 1941
the administration knew that a Japanese attack was
coming (a “war warning” was issued on November
27 to all U.S. Army and Navy commanders), and
“[i]n spite of the risk involved . . . in letting the Japanese fire the first shot,” said Stimson, “we realized that in
order to have the full support of the American people
it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the
ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in
anyone’s mind as to who were the aggressors.”115
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Luckily for the Roosevelt administration, the
Japanese obliged. Japanese leaders had come to regard
war with the United States as both inevitable and—after
the imposition of the oil embargo—urgent, and they
seemed completely oblivious to the domestic political
difficulties they might have caused Roosevelt by
confining their attacks in Southeast Asia to British and
Dutch possessions. The IJN in particular insisted that
the United States and Great Britain were strategically
inseparable (mirroring Roosevelt’s view of Germany
and Japan) and that an attack on the British and the
Dutch in Southeast Asia was sure to provoke a violent
U.S. response, and therefore that it was imperative to
preempt the United States militarily.
Unluckily for the administration, war with Japan
might well have been avoided but for an unwillingness—in an age of Western territorial empires—to
accept the legitimacy of any Japanese imperial ambitions in East Asia (outside Korea), and but for a
failure to appreciate Tokyo’s probable response to
economic sanctions that threatened to eliminate Japan
as a respectable industrial and military power. A refusal
to accept some measure of Japanese hegemony in
Manchuria and North China (as the Japanese accepted
America’s self-proclaimed hegemony in the Western
Hemisphere) precluded a negotiated settlement that
might have enabled the Roosevelt administration to
concentrate U.S. attention and resources on the Nazi
German threat in Europe that it rightly regarded as
far more dangerous than Japanese aggression in East
Asia. And by airily jerking its lethal economic leash
around Japan’s neck to punish Tokyo for aggression
that Washington was never prepared to resist by force,
or even threatened force, the Roosevelt administration
invited the very war in the Far East it sought to avoid.
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“Instead of complementing his Europe-first strategy
and orientation, the oil embargo threatened to disorient
and distract [Roosevelt] from what he conceived to be
his primary task by forcing Japan to consider war,”
conclude David Klein and Hilary Conroy.116 Roland
Worth, Jr., contends that “the U.S. decision to embargo
90 percent of Japan’s petroleum and two-thirds of
its trade led directly to the attack on Pearl Harbor.”
Although “striking at the economic Achilles Heel of
Japan was naturally appealing in light of its economy’s
comparative weakness, it only made sense if one were
genuinely ready to negotiate a mutually acceptable
compromise (which meant leaving Japan a good
part of its empire) or if one were willing to risk the
military retaliation that Japan . . . was quite capable
of inflicting.”117 Bruce Russett agrees: “The Japanese
attack would not have come but for the . . . embargo on
the shipment of strategic materials to Japan. . . . Either
raw material supplies had to be restored by a peaceful
settlement with the Western powers, or access to the
resources in Thailand, Malaya, and the Indies would
have to be secured by force while Japan still retained
the capabilities to do so.”118 The late historian John
Toland, in his best-selling The Rising Sun: The Decline
and Fall of the Japanese Empire, concluded that:
America made a grave diplomatic blunder by allowing
an issue not vital to her basic interests—the welfare of
China—to become, at the last moment, the keystone of
her foreign policy. Until that summer [of 1941] America
had two limited objectives in the Far East: to drive a
wedge between Japan and Hitler, and to thwart Japan’s
southward thrust. She could easily have obtained both
these objectives but instead made an issue out of no issue
at all, the Tripartite Pact, and insisted on the liberation of
China. . . . America could not throw the weight of her
strength against Japan to liberate China, nor had she ever
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intended to. Her major enemy was Hitler. [The Pacific
War was] a war that need not have been fought.119

Coercive diplomacy requires carrots as well as
sticks, but the United States was never prepared to
make any concessions to Japan, not even a temporary
modus vivendi—for example, a return to the status quo
ante before Japan’s move into southern Indochina and
the U.S. imposition of the oil embargo. Such a deal was
actually proposed in late 1941 by Admiral Kichisaburo
Nomura, Japan’s ambassador to the United States and a
staunch opponent of war with America, and endorsed
by Marshall and Stark as a means of affording the
United States more time to strengthen U.S. defenses in
the Pacific.120 In the absence of any attempt to conciliate
Japan on crucial issues, U.S. coercive diplomacy was
doomed to fail. George C. Herring, in his majesterial
history of American foreign policy, concludes that:
Had the [United States] abandoned, at least temporarily,
its determination to drive the Japanese from China and
restored some trade, it might have delayed a two-front
war when it was not yet ready to fight one major enemy.
Having already learned what seemed the hard lessons
of appeasement [in Europe], U.S. officials rejected a
course of expediency. Rather, they backed a proud
nation into a position where its only choices were war
or surrender.121

Conclusions.
Japan’s imperial ambitions in East Asia inexorably
collided with Western interests in the region, and
Japan’s alliance with Nazi Germany, though of
little operational significance, further alienated the
Western powers. The Pacific War arose out of Japan’s
aggression in Southeast Asia, which was presaged
by its occupation of southern Indochina in July 1941.
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Had Tokyo confined its aggression to Northeast Asia,
it almost certainly could have avoided war with
Britain and the United States, neither of which was
prepared to go to war over China. The U.S. insistence,
after Japanese forces moved into southern Indochina,
that Japan evacuate China as well as Indochina, as a
condition for the restoration of trade relations, thus
made no sense as a means of dissuading the Japanese
from moving south. On the contrary, the demand that
Japan quit China killed any prospect of a negotiated
alternative to Japan’s conquest of Southeast Asia (e.g.,
restored trade in exchange for Japan’s withdrawal
from Indochina). In effect, the United States went to
war over China rather than Southeast Asia—a volte-face
of enormous strategic consequence since it propelled
the United States into a war with Japan over a remote
country for which the United States had never been
prepared to fight. The fate of China, even of Southeast
Asia, did not engage core U.S. security interests,
especially at a time when Europe’s fate hung in the
balance. A war with Japan was, of course, a war the
United States was always going to win, but Japan was
not the enemy the Roosevelt administration wanted to
fight. The United States could have settled its accounts
with Japan after Hitler’s defeat had been assured. Was
denying Japan an expanded empire in Southeast Asia
more important, in 1941, than defeating Hitler?
The roots of Japan’s decision for war with the United
States were economic and reputational. The termination
of U.S. trade with Japan that followed Roosevelt’s
freezing of Japanese assets in July 1941 threatened to
destroy Japan economically and militarily. A small,
resource-poor, and overpopulated island state, Japan
in the 1930s sought economic self-sufficiency and great
power status via the acquisition of empire—just as Great
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Britain had done. (The United States could preach about
the evils of imperialism and “spheres of influence”
because, as a huge, resource-rich, continental state, it
had no need for an overseas colonial empire; nor was
its hegemony in the Western Hemisphere effectively
challenged by other great powers. Indeed, the Japanese
viewed the Monroe Doctrine as justification for their
imperial ambitions.) Kenneth Pyle, in his masterful
assessment of modern Japan’s behavior in the evolving
international system, identifies “a persistent obsession
with status and prestige—or, to put it in terms Japanese
would more readily recognize, rank and honor.”122
From the time of the Meiji Restoration in 1868, “Japan
strove and struggled for status as a great power. Other
countries in Asia were aware of their backwardness,
but nowhere else was this awareness so intense and
so paramount that it drove a people with such singleminded determination. It became a national obsession
to be the equal of the world’s great powers.”123 A
fusion of state-centered honor and popular nationalism
occurred in Japan that prompted “an instinctive need
for recognition of its status in the hierarchy of nations,
and the values of hierarchy provided a behavioral
norm that focused and intensified the realist drive for
national power. Establishment of Japan’s honor, of
its reputation for power in relation to other nations,
became a goal sanctioned by inherited values and
norms.”124
Yet the end result of this drive for power, honor,
and reputation was Japan’s complete destruction and
subsequent occupation by the United States. There can
be no justification for a foreign policy that consciously
propels a state into a war against an inherently
undefeatable enemy. By the late 1930s, a fatal abyss
had opened between Japan’s imperial ambitions and
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its material capacity to fulfill them. Japan simply did
not have the resources to police Korea and Manchuria,
conquer China, invade Southeast Asia, and defeat the
United States in the Pacific. Japan lacked the necessary
industrial strength, and what modest manufacturing
base it did possess critically depended on imported oil
and other commodities from the United States. Indeed,
Japan’s expanding war on the Asian mainland made
it more dependent on imported U.S. commodities and
finished goods. Japanese leaders refused to recognize
the limits of Japan’s power, despite the warnings of
Nomohan and a continuing war in China they could
never bring to a satisfactory conclusion. The very
fact that Japanese leaders would consider sequential
wars with the United States and the Soviet Union at a
time when Japan was already militarily overstretched
in China testifies to a fatal blindness to the strategic
necessity of maintaining some reasonable harmony
between political ambitions and military capacity. Like
the Germans in both world wars, the Japanese seemed
to believe that superior prowess at the operational level
of war could and would—somehow—redeem reckless
strategic decisions.125 And again like the Germans, the
Japanese, in the celebration of their own nationalism,
were utterly insensitive to the nationalism of others.
Honor may have dictated the Japanese decision for
war in 1941, but “suicide before dishonor” was a policy
choice the Japanese might have avoided had Tokyo
been willing and able to temper its imperial ambitions
and accept some measure of economic dependence
on the United States. For Japan, the prosperous and
relatively democratic 1920s and the postwar decades
as an economic powerhouse and ally of the United
States demonstrate 20th-century possibilities other
than the path of autarky through aggression. The 1930s
and 1940s were a tragic and—for Japan’s victims—
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murderous detour from what might have been—and
later was. For Japan in the 20th century, good relations
with the United States were always a prerequisite for a
secure Japan, whereas war with the United States was
always going to be a disaster.
Still, it cannot be denied that, in threatening Japan’s
economic destruction (and consequent military impoverishment), the United States placed the Japanese
in a position in which the only choices open to them
were war or subservience. “Never inflict upon another
major military power a policy which would cause you
yourself to go to war unless you are fully prepared to
engage that power militarily,” cautions Roland Worth,
Jr., in his No Choice But War: The United States Embargo
against Japan and the Eruption of War in the Pacific. “And
don’t be surprised that if they do decide to retaliate,
that they seek out a time and a place that inflicts
maximum harm and humiliation upon your cause.”126
Roosevelt called the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
“unprovoked.” Was it?
Lessons for Today.
The Japanese-American interaction of 1941 that led
to war yields several enduring lessons of particular
relevance to today’s national security decisionmakers.
First, fear and honor, “rational” or not, can motivate as much
as interest. The “realist” explanation of international
politics as the struggle for power among calculating,
self-interested states discounts fright, ideology, and
pride as motivators of state behavior. Thucydides
wrote that it was “the growth of the power of Athens,
and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, that made
war inevitable” between the two city states.127 Clearly,
it was the alarm inspired in Tokyo by the U.S. oil
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embargo—and the absence of an honorable alternative
to war—that made the Pacific War inevitable.
Frightened national leaderships can behave recklessly,
as can leaderships in the grip of powerful political or
racial ideologies. The George W. Bush administration
arguably overreacted to the horror of the September
11, 2001 (9/11) al-Qaeda terrorist attacks by invading
and occupying Iraq, a country that had no link to the
attacks, and it was Hitler’s racial beliefs that propelled
Nazi Germany into its fatal invasion of the Soviet
Union. Honor can be no less a motivator—witness not
only Japan’s decision for war against the United States
in 1941 but also Churchill’s decision the year before
to fight on after Dunkirk. France waged two fruitless
wars in Indochina and Algeria because French leaders
believed loss of empire would diminish France’s
prestige as a world power. For reasons of honor, the
American Confederacy, like the Japanese in World
War II, fought on long after any reasonable hope of
victory had vanished. Gordon Prange observed that
the “Americans assumed, correctly, that Japan could
not win a sustained war against the United States.
What they failed to consider was one of the lessons
of history: A so-called ‘have-not’ nation may well be
possessed of a will and skill far out of proportion to
her resources. A later generation of Americans learned
this the hard way in Vietnam where, lacking the will to
win, the U.S. suffered a humiliating defeat.”128
Second, there is no substitute for knowledge of
a potential adversary’s history and culture. Mutual
cultural ignorance was a major factor contributing
to the outbreak of war in 1941. With some notable
exceptions like Ambassador Grew, American foreign
policymakers knew little or nothing about Japan or the
Japanese. On the Japanese side, there were some, like
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Admiral Yamamoto, who knew the United States well
and respected American power and nationalism, but
most Japanese leaders, especially senior IJA officers,
knew little or nothing about America and Americans.
Racial stereotypes prevailed on both sides, with the
Americans, who had a long history of discrimination
against racial minorities, including Japanese, believing
the Japanese were a little yellow people incapable of
waging war effectively against a modern Western
power like the United States; and with the Japanese,
who also regarded themselves as racially superior to
their enemies, especially the Chinese, believing that the
Americans were too materialistic and individualistic
to muster the national discipline necessary for a long
and bloody war. The Japanese were oblivious to the
galvanizing effect their attack on Pearl Harbor was
certain to have on American public opinion.
Cultural ignorance continues to plague U.S. foreign
policy. Americans proved to be as culturally ignorant
of Vietnam and Iraq as they were of Japan, and it is
testimony to that ignorance that the United States
is probably the only modern country in the world
where a person who speaks no foreign language can
yet be considered well-educated. The United States
came to grief in Vietnam and Iraq because of a lack
of knowledge of the two countries “best described
as comprehensive and spectacular,” observes Dennis
Showalter.129 Colin Gray convincingly argues that
America’s “strategic performance” is still hampered
by cultural insensitivity.
Bear in mind American public ideology, with its emphasis
on political and moral uniqueness, manifest destiny,
divine mission even, married to the multidimensional
sense of national greatness. Such self-evaluation has not
inclined Americans to be respectful of the beliefs, habits,
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and behaviors of other cultures. This has been, and
continues to be, especially unfortunate in the inexorably
competitive field of warfare. From the Indian Wars on
the internal frontier to Iraq and Afghanistan today, the
American way of war has suffered from the self-inflicted
damage caused by failure to understand the enemy
of the day. For a state that now accepts, indeed insists
upon, a global mandate to act as sheriff, this lack of
cultural empathy, including a lack of sufficiently critical
self-knowledge, is most serious.130

Third, deterrence lies in the mind of the deterree, not
the deterrer. To be effective, threatened force has to be
credible to the enemy—i.e., the enemy has to believe
that you have both the capacity and the will to what
you threaten to do, and that what you threaten to
do is unacceptable. The Roosevelt administration
attempted to deter a Japanese military advance into
Southeast Asia via an open-ended deployment of
powerful U.S. naval forces to Hawaii, imposition of
escalating economic sanctions, and a military buildup
in the Philippines. Key members of the administration
assumed that the Japanese could be deterred because—
surely—Tokyo knew it could not win a war with the
United States. But at no point along the road to Pearl
Harbor did the administration clearly threaten war;
nor did it understand, until it was too late, that Tokyo
preferred the risk of a lost war to a shameful peace.
Though the imposition of the oil embargo was clearly
unacceptable to the Japanese, they opted for war rather
than submission. They were provoked, not deterred.
America’s crushing latent military superiority
over Japan actually encouraged war because it made
the passage of time a deadly enemy. Small though the
possibilities of even a limited victory were in 1941,
they would soon vanish altogether as the United States
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rearmed. Because the military balance was shifting
irreversibly against Japan, Tokyo believed it had
to initiate war as soon as possible to have a fighting
chance.
Fourth, strategy must always inform and guide
operations. The Japanese never had a coherent strategy
for achieving their myriad objectives in China
and Southeast Asia. This absence of strategy was
attributable in part to the unbridgeable gap between
Tokyo’s ambitions in East Asia and its available military
resources, and in part to the Japanese military’s focus
on the operational level of war. The attack on Pearl
Harbor was a crap shoot, a reckless roll of the dice
with profound consequences which the Japanese never
fully grasped because Tokyo never had a strategy for
defeating the United States. The Japanese never had
a clear or convincing picture of how a war with the
United States might end; they seemed to believe, or
at least hope, that early operational successes would
somehow deliver ultimate strategic success.
One is reminded of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq,
especially the prewar lack of postwar planning and the
mismatch between the amount of force employed and
the war’s objective of Iraq’s political reconstruction.
War planning focused almost exclusively on the
destruction of the old regime through a rapid
conventional military campaign that would validate
the effectiveness of “transformed” U.S. military forces.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) sought a
quick military victory and was oblivious to the potential
force requirements for stabilizing post-Saddam Iraq.
The apparent assumptions, at least among OSD’s
neoconservatives, were that Americans would be
welcomed as liberators and that a stable democracy
would naturally arise in Iraq once tyranny had been
removed.
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Fifth, economic sanctioning can be tantamount to an
act of war. The economic sanctions the United States
imposed on Japan in 1941 were probably the most
ruinous of any in history short of wartime naval
blockades. They were so destructive that the Japanese
concluded they had no recourse but war. The damage
that economic sanctions can inflict upon a state that
is highly dependent on international trade can be
equivalent to, if less dramatic than, an armed attack; as
such, they can provoke a violent reaction. The common
view of economic sanctioning as an alternative to
war needs to be reassessed, especially by the United
States, which routinely sanctions regimes it does not
like. Sanctioning is an inherently hostile act intended
to coerce the sanctioned state to alter its behavior in
some very important way, and today some states, like
Iran, have means of responding that avoid militarily
challenging the United States head-on.
Sixth, the presumption of moral or spiritual superiority
can fatally discount the consequences of an enemy’s material
superiority. Clausewitz was right: the best strategy
is to be strong. The Japanese were hardly the last of
America’s enemies to believe that a superior willingness
to fight and die could neutralize or even defeat U.S.
advantages in firepower and technology. Mao Tsetung convinced himself that the superior motivation
and tactics of the People's Liberation Army could
drive the Americans out of Korea, and other enemies,
including Saddam Hussein (during the Persian Gulf
crisis of 1990-91) and Osama bin Laden, believed that
the U.S. defeat in Vietnam and humiliation in Lebanon
revealed an aversion to incurring casualties that could
be decisively exploited. Facing a much stronger enemy
can compel a belief in the offsetting superiority of
one’s own cause, race, or strategy and tactics. Indeed,
irregular warfare offers the militarily weak perhaps
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the only chance of defeating the militarily strong,
although most insurgencies fail precisely because
they are simply too weak to win without ultimately
developing a capacity for regular warfare. Mao Tsetung himself regarded guerrilla warfare as a transition
and complement to regular warfare. “The concept that
guerrilla warfare is an end in itself and that guerrilla
activities can be divorced from those of the regular
forces is incorrect,” he wrote in 1937. “[T]here can
be no doubt that our regular forces are of primary
importance, because it is they who are alone capable
of producing the decision. Guerrilla warfare assists
them in producing this favorable decision.”131 Mao had
great respect for the conventional military superiority
of his enemies, as did the Vietnamese Communists for
that of the French and the Americans. The Vietnamese
Communists employed regular military forces, not
guerrillas, to defeat the French at Dien Bien Phu in
1954 and to overrun South Vietnam in 1975.
Seventh, “inevitable” war easily becomes a self-fulfilling
prophecy. A war becomes inevitable when at least one
side comes to believe it. Japan squandered a potentially
decisive opportunity to avoid war with the United
States by attacking only Europe’s colonial possessions
in Southeast Asia. Absent the attacks on Pearl Harbor
and the Philippines, Roosevelt would have found it
extremely difficult, perhaps even impossible, to carry
the American electorate into war with Japan, and the
Japanese would have gone on to secure the resources of
the rest of Southeast Asia without arousing the armed
wrath of the United States. By late summer of 1941,
however, most Japanese leaders had come to regard
war with the United States as unavoidable—and so it
became as the Japanese moved to initiate it under the
most favorable possible operational circumstances.
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The assumption of inevitability encourages, even
mandates, exploiting the temporal opportunities of
striking first, especially if the military balance with the
enemy is shifting in his favor. Preventive war, which
is not to be confused with preemptive military action
to defeat a certain and imminent attack, rests upon the
assumptions of inevitability and unfavorable strategic
trends. The claim of inevitability also can be used to
excuse or justify outright aggression. The George W.
Bush administration believed, or at least publicly argued, that war with Saddam Hussein’s regime was inevitable and that it was imperative to start that war before the Iraqi dictator acquired nuclear weapons. Unlike
the Roosevelt administration, which mistakenly assumed that Japan was deterrable, the Bush administration assumed, or at least asserted, that a nucleararmed Saddam Hussein would be undeterrable. It
remains unclear whether proponents of war with
Iraq really believed that war was inevitable and that
Saddam was undeterrable; there was no persuasive
prewar evidence that Iraq had a viable nuclear weapons
program, but substantial evidence existed that Saddam
was effectively deterred, and would have remained
deterred, from using any weapon of mass destruction
against the United States or U.S. forces in the Persian
Gulf region.132 What is clear is that the moral, strategic,
and financial costs of the U.S. preventive war against
Iraq have—so far—greatly exceeded the benefits
claimed before the war by the Bush administration and
its neoconservative supporters.
The American experience in Iraq should serve as a
warning to those who believe the United States should
use force, if necessary, to prevent Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons. Some of the same neoconservative
pundits and like-minded politicians who called for
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preventive war against Iraq are now calling for war
against Iran on the same discredited grounds that a
nuclear-armed Iran would be undeterrable and that a
war with that country, or at least its governing regime,
is inevitable, and that it is better to have it before rather
than after Teheran “goes nuclear.” Yet short of an
invasion and occupation of Iran, for which the United
States simply lacks the necessary force (and political
will), no military strike, even one based on exquisite
intelligence, could promise anything other than a
retardation of Iran’s drive to acquire nuclear weapons.
(The relevant lesson here is the 1981 Israeli air attack on
Iraq’s nuclear facility at Osirak, which simply reinforced
Saddam’s nuclear weapons ambitions and drove the
Iraqi program literally underground.) Nor, despite
the rantings of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is
there any convincing evidence that a nuclear-armed
Iran would be undeterrable; Ahmadinejad is not the
Iranian government’s primary decisionmaker, and the
evidence strongly suggests that Iran is seeking nuclear
weapons for purposes of deterrence and prestige, not
aggression.133 Moreover, Iran, unlike Iraq in 2003, is not
helpless; it could retaliate against U.S. forces in Iraq
and oil tanker traffic in the Persian Gulf and foment
terrorist attacks against American targets throughout
the Middle East. The negative consequences of a U.S.
(or Israeli) strike against Iran, which almost certainly
would strengthen the current regime’s political grip on
the country, would likely far outweigh any short-term
benefits.134
Surely, the United States is not condemned to repeat
in Iran its preventive war debacle in Iraq.
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